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Capital Gains Taxation and Funding for Start-Up Firms 
Abstract 
We examine how capital gains taxes affect investment in start-up (i.e., pre-IPO) firms. Using data 
on capital raised by start-up firms in individual funding rounds, we estimate the effect of the SBJA 
of 2010, which implemented a full exemption from federal capital gains tax on the sale of qualified 
shares. Because of higher expected after-tax returns (lower future capital gains taxes), we 
hypothesize and find evidence consistent with this capital gains tax reduction increasing the 
amount of investment in start-up firms per funding round by about 12%. We also provide evidence 
that this effect is concentrated in start-up firms that are likely to be more financially sophisticated. 
1 
1 Introduction 
Start-up firms are an important source of innovation, productivity growth and job creation 
(Haltiwanger et al. 2012; Decker et al. 2014; Adelino et al. 2017). Investor returns in these firms 
are largely generated in the form of capital gains realized in subsequent takeovers or after the initial 
public offering (IPO). As such, capital gains taxation is likely an important determinant of the cost 
of capital for start-up firms. However, prior studies remain largely silent on how taxation affects 
entrepreneurs’ financing and organizational form decisions (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). In this 
study, we provide empirical evidence on the effect of a reduction in capital gains taxation on the 
amount of funding raised by entrepreneurs. 
One potential reason for the lack of empirical evidence is the limited availability of data 
on start-up firm financing. Prior literature examining the impact of taxation on venture capital 
funding relies on aggregate venture capital investment data (e.g., Poterba 1989) or firm-level 
financing data following an IPO (Guenther and Willenborg 1999).1 However, financing data on 
most start-up firms is unavailable because they operate as private firms. In this study, we overcome 
this data constraint by analyzing comprehensive information on start-up firm financing that has 
recently been made available through Crunchbase.com. Crunchbase is an online platform that 
tracks venture capital financing and allows users to observe the firm-level funding volume for 
start-up firms in each round of financing. Our benchmark sample contains 13,431 start-up firms 
that raised an overall total amount of $218.5 billion in funding during the sample period. As 
pointed out by Kaplan and Lerner (2016), the database provides an opportunity to study the 
evolution of start-up firm funding in greater detail. Most importantly, information on initial (pre-
IPO) funding rounds allows for the study of the financing environment for entrepreneurial activity 
1 Several other studies, which do not focus on taxation, use hand-collected information on funding rounds, usually for 
a smaller set of randomly selected venture capital backed firms (e.g., Gompers 1995). 
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in the earliest stages of a business where access to external financial resources is crucial for the 
business to succeed.  
In our empirical analyses, we use Crunchbase to identify the effect of changes in capital 
gains taxation on the financing environment of start-up firms. In particular, we analyze the impact 
of the 2010 Small Business Jobs Act (2010 SBJA), which provided for a full exemption from 
federal taxation of capital gains realized on the sale of the shares of certain small businesses. The 
stock of these firms is called Qualified Small Business Stock (QSBS) if it qualifies for this 
preferential treatment.2  
In order to be considered as QSBS, there are several requirements that need to be met. An 
important condition that we exploit in our identification strategy is the requirement for the start-
up firm to be a “qualified trade or business.” The provisions of the 2010 SBJA explicitly excludes 
start-up firms focusing on accounting, health, engineering, banking, insurance, or financing 
services from QSBS status. Start-up firms active in one of the excluded sectors are thus not affected 
by the 2010 SBJA and their shareholders do not receive the preferential treatment on any capital 
gains realized upon the disposition of their shares. However, they are likely to be affected by 
changes in other factors that trigger changes in start-up firm financing such as labor market and 
macroeconomic conditions, investment restrictions and other regulatory policies (Gompers and 
Lerner 2001) and therefore represent an appropriate control group to use in a difference-in-
difference estimation. This approach is particularly useful for investigating the 2010 SBJA, which 
also contained other measures besides the reduction in capital gains taxation. These measures were, 
however, not restricted to certain types of firms in the same way as the QSBS tax exemption and 
can be controlled for in a difference-in-difference design. Thus, we estimate the effect of the capital 
2 We focus on the full exemption of capital gains provided for under the 2010 SBJA but perform some sensitivity 
analysis around the 75% exemption that was enacted earlier. See section 4 for a discussion of this test and these issues. 
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gains reduction on venture capital funding by observing the difference in funding obtained by 
treated and non-treated start-up firms (i.e., firms that qualify as QSBS versus non-QSBS) before 
and after the 2010 SBJA.  
Whether or not a capital gains tax reduction is a meaningful measure to alleviate the 
financing constraints of start-up firms is subject to substantial debate. Proponents of the capital 
gains tax exemption argue that the substantial tax benefits significantly increase the after-tax 
investment returns and will necessarily increase investment. Critics argue that the administrative 
requirements of such targeted tax regimes prevents many firms from being eligible and place such 
an administrative burden on eligible entities that most start-up firms will not derive a substantial 
benefit. Further, to our knowledge, prior studies have not provided evidence on whether capital 
gains taxation affects the supply side of venture capital funding. While, intuitively, lower capital 
gains taxation should increase the after-tax return of investments in equity, which should also 
increase the aggregate amount invested, it remains an empirical question whether such a 
mechanism exists in less liquid private markets such as those for funding start-up firms.3  
The results of our difference-in-difference analysis suggest that the implementation of the 
2010 SBJA had a positive impact on the amount of capital raised by qualifying start-up firms. On 
average, the reform increased the funding per round by approximately 12%. Evaluated at the 
average amount of funding available to treated firms in our sample, this implies that the 2010 
SBJA generated additional funding totalling $9.6 billion for start-up firms. This finding is robust 
to various additional tests related to the incorporation status of start-up firms, the inclusion of a 
number of state level control variables, and restrictions on the amount of funding per round.  
We also identify some heterogeneity in our findings across firms. In order to qualify as 
                                                 
3 As discussed in greater detail in section 2, there is debate as to which party should benefit from such provisions.  
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QSBS, a firm must meet a number of criteria (discussed further below) that require substantial 
reporting requirements. We argue that firms lacking sufficient financial sophistication (i.e., 
professional and legal expertise) are less likely to satisfy the 2010 SBJA requirements or may not 
even be aware of the provisions. We conjecture that firms with a single founder, who is most likely 
focused on operations, are less likely to have this financial expertise. Firms with multiple founders 
are more likely to have at least one of their founders with some degree of financial sophistication. 
Alternatively, firms with founders that have also acted as advisors to other firms are also more 
likely to have some financial expertise. We predict that start-up firms with two or more founders, 
or a founder who is also an advisor to other firms, are more likely to have this financial expertise 
and are able to structure the start-up in such a way that it may qualify for QSBS and thus benefit 
from the capital gains tax reduction under the 2010 SBJA. We observe that the impact of 2010 
SBJA is mainly concentrated in these start-up firms with greater financial sophistication. 
The main results are robust to a battery of robustness tests. These tests include a generalized 
difference-in-difference research design, which also validates the identifying assumption in our 
primary analysis. Further analyses examine the robustness around the size of funding rounds (i.e., 
removing large funding rounds to help ensure firms are below the size cap to qualify as QSBS), 
and the exclusion of a number of sample years to ensure the results are not an artifact of the 
expiration of the 2003 tax cuts. We also preform a placebo test randomly assigning observations 
to the treatment and control groups. A distribution of the observed coefficients from 1,000 
repetitions of this test illustrates that it is unlikely that our main finding is randomly observed. 
We perform several supplemental analyses to shed additional light on the effects of the 
2010 SBJA and the QSBS capital gains tax exemptions. Specifically, we examine if the 5 year 
holding requirement to qualify as QSBS resulted in start-up firms delaying exits. We document 
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that the timing of gain realization (captured through the observed exit date through IPO or takeover) 
does not appear to be impacted by the 2010 SBJA. Finally, we analyze whether the observed 
increase in funding was a result of (i) additional investors providing funding to qualified start-ups, 
or (ii) existing investors providing a greater amount of funding in each funding round. We observe 
that prior to the 2010 SBJA the average number of investors per funding round is greater for the 
control group but following the SBJA the average number of investors per funding round is greater 
for the treatment group. We also observe that the average funding per investor is relatively constant 
throughout the sample period. Taken together, this descriptive evidence is consistent with the 
increase in funding for qualifying start-up firms following the 2010 SBJA being driven by 
additional investors providing funding to those qualifying firms (i.e., increasing the supply of 
funding to start-up firms). 
This paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on capital gains taxation and the 
cost of capital for small, pre-IPO start-up firms. While prior work has examined the effect of capital 
gains taxation on public firms (Guenther and Willenborg 1999; Lang and Shackelford 2000; Ayers 
et al. 2003; Dai et al. 2008; Blouin et al. 2009; Sikes and Verrecchia 2012; Li et al. 2016), several 
studies show that the early stages are the period where access to venture capital is crucial for the 
further success of start-up firms (Hellmann and Puri 2002; Kerr et al. 2014; Krishnan et al. 2015). 
Documenting an association between capital gains taxation and funding for start-up firms fills this 
important gap in the literature. Given the substantial cost of tax-related incentives for start-up 
financing, this result is also of high policy relevance.4 
Second, we contribute to the stream of studies that analyze the supply side of venture 
                                                 
4 The estimated cost of the federal capital gains tax cut in the 2010 SBJA amounts to $5.1 billion over ten years 
(2011-2021). See Report JCX-19-11 from March 17, 2011 by the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
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capital (Jeng and Wells 2000; Da Rin et al. 2006; Hochberg et al. 2010). Our research design 
focuses explicitly on the supply side of venture capital funding and thus provides important 
insights regarding the extent that it is affected by capital gains taxation. Our main results are 
consistent with an increase in the amount of funding that qualified firms raise in each funding 
round following the 2010 SBJA. In supplemental tests, we document results consistent with the 
increase in funding coming from additional investors providing funding to qualified start-ups (as 
opposed to existing investors providing a greater amount of funding in each funding round). 
Although we lack a long enough sample period to trace the effect of capital gains taxation over 
time, our results suggest that in the current diverse financing environment, capital gains taxation 
affects the supply-side of venture capital. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of capital gains tax exemptions for start-up investments and develops our hypotheses. 
We then provide details on the research design and the data in Section 3. The main empirical 
findings are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents additional analyses and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 The 2010 SBJA and Capital Gains Tax Exemptions for Qualified Small Business Stock 
An exemption for capital gains from the sale of shares held in qualified firms (Qualified 
Small Business Stock, QSBS) from federal taxation was first introduced at an exemption rate of 
50% by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, which added Section 1202 to the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC). For shares to be treated as QSBS, they must fulfill several requirements.5 
First, the shares need to be issued by a firm that is incorporated as a C corporation and does not 
have more than $50 million in gross assets before or immediately after the issuance. Gross assets 
                                                 
5 Regulation on the tax payer side restrict the amount of eligible gain within one year to $ 10 million or 10 times the 
aggregate adjusted basis of QSBS sold in this year. 
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for this purpose include cash holdings and the adjusted bases of other property held by the 
corporation. However, it should be noted that previously issued stock does not disqualify from the 
QSBS exemption once a firm is above the gross asset threshold of $50 million. It merely prevents 
the firm from issuing QSBS again. Second, the firm must be engaged in a “qualified trade or 
business.” Generally, any business for which the principal asset is the skill or reputation of at least 
one employee of the firm does not qualify. This explicitly excludes the provision of professional 
services in certain areas (e.g. health, accounting, finance, consulting, leasing) as well as farming 
and extractive activities from the exemption under Section 1202 (see Table 1 for complete list). 
We use firms that are engaged in these activities as a control group in our difference-in-difference 
estimation below. Third, the stock must have been acquired at its original issuance, which excludes 
any shares traded on the secondary market. Finally, to qualify for the capital gains tax exemption, 
the stock must have been held by the investor for at least 5 consecutive years. 
It should be noted that any investing entity, other than a corporation, might benefit from 
QSBS status. Thus, in addition to stock held directly by individuals, investments held through 
partnerships or other pass-through entities qualify as long as the shareholder has joined the entity 
before the acquisition of QSBS. This means that both individual angel investors and venture capital 
firms can benefit from Section 1202. These are the types of investors that have traditionally 
dominated funding for start-ups and also form the large majority of investors in our data. 
The exemption of capital gains under Section 1202 relates to the ordinary income tax rate 
on long-term capital gains (28% in 1993). Gains exempted under Section 1202 were treated as a 
preference item with regard to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). This means that high-income 
earners added back 7% of the exempted gains and paid taxes on this amount at the rate of 28%. 
Thus, when Section 1202 was implemented in 1993 with an exemption of 50%, the resulting 
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effective tax rate for capital gains that benefit from the QSBS exemption was 14.98% if AMT 
applied and 14% if it did not. Importantly, when the reduced tax rate on long-term capital gains 
was introduced by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, tax payers had to choose between benefiting 
from the reduced tax rate or the QSBS exemption. The reduced tax rate was initially introduced at 
a maximum rate of 20%, which was later reduced to 15% by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003.6 Because of the very small spread in the rates, the QSBS exemption 
was largely ineffective from 1997 onwards. The reporting costs and the stricter conditions on 
holding periods and qualifying activities related to QSBS were substantial compared to the 
relatively small tax benefit resulting from this exemption when compared to taxing capital gains 
at the reduced rate of 15%.7 In 2009, the QSBS exemption was temporarily increased to 75%. 
However, it still constituted an AMT preference item such that the effective tax rate remained 
relatively high at 8.47%.  
This was changed by the 2010 SBJA, which raised the exemption to 100% for all QSBS 
acquired after September 27, 2010. Initially, this was implemented as a temporary measure with 
only stock acquired by December 31, 2010 qualifying. The period was extended several times, 
first to the end of 2011, then to the end of 2013, and the end of 2014 before it was finally made 
permanent by the 2015 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act.  
The 2010 SBJA also provided that the excluded amount would not be subject to AMT. 
Thus the effective tax rate for capital gains that qualified as a sale of QSBS was set to zero. As a 
consequence, this reform was widely perceived as the most pronounced change. For instance, it 
got a lot more public attention than other reforms. Consistent with this notion, Figure 1 presents 
the evolution of the number of online searches for QSBS as recorded by Google Trends. We 
                                                 
6 Lower rates applied to tax payers in lower personal income tax brackets. 
7 This has been highlighted by practitioners on various occasions, for instance by Wood (2007a).  
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observe an extraordinarily strong increase in online attention directly after the 2010 SBJA was 
implemented. We also note that most of the searches come from California (untabulated), where 
most of the start-up firms in our sample are located. Moreover, the lack of attention before the 
reform implementation suggests that there was only limited anticipation of the law change. People 
only gathered information once the law was passed. While the 2010 SBJA appears to be the most 
important reform with regard to capital gains taxation for start-up investments, we further account 
for a potential effect of the 2009 reform in a generalized difference-in-differences research design. 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
As discussed above, the 2010 SBJA exempted certain capital stock from capital gains taxes 
(i.e., capital gains on QSBS). If prices are held constant, a decrease in capital gains taxation will 
increase the after-tax return on investments in these start-up firms (i.e., given the same purchase 
and sale price, lower tax payments result in higher after tax returns).  If this is descriptive, investors 
will realize all the benefits from the exemption from capital gains taxes on QSBS.  
As a natural response to the expected higher after-tax returns on QSBS, investors may be 
more willing to purchase shares of start-up firms that qualify for the exemption from capital gains 
taxation. This greater willingness to invest will cause potential investors to bid up the price of 
QSBS and allow those start-up firms to raise additional capital. In perfect and complete markets, 
the price will rise so that the after-tax return on the investment will remain constant.8 Accordingly, 
we make our first formal hypothesis: 
H1: Firms issuing qualified small business stock (QSBS) will raise more funding following 
the 2010 Small Business Jobs Act (SBJA). 
 
While prior literature has documented capitalization of capital gains taxes in public firms, 
                                                 
8 In the Scholes and Wolfson framework, this lower pre-tax rate of return on a tax-favored asset is labelled as an im-
plicit tax (Scholes et al. 2014). 
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we are not aware of prior research examining the impact of capital gains taxes on early stage, pre-
IPO firms. In this unique setting, it is possible that we do not observe our hypothesized relation as 
it is not clear whether such a mechanism exists in less liquid private markets, such as those for 
funding start-up firms. For these early stage firms and their founders, taxes might not be a first 
order consideration as they focus on products and attempt to obtain funding simply to maintain 
solvency and operations. Also anecdotally, critics argue that the 2010 SBJA requirements prevent 
many firms from being eligible and place such an administrative burden on eligible firms that most 
start-ups will not derive a substantial benefit from the 2010 SBJA.9 Therefore, it is an empirical 
question as to whether capital gains capitalization exists in start-up firms and whether they will 
benefit from the reduction in capital gains taxes in the 2010 SBJA. 
Related to this notion of founders focusing on operations rather than financial issues such 
as taxation, we argue that firms with greater financial sophistication at founding are more likely to 
ensure they benefit from the provisions of the 2010 SBJA and exempt the capital gains on their 
stock from taxation. For example, firms that have a single founder, who is almost certainly focused 
on the operations side of the firm, are less likely to have the financial expertise necessary to either 
be aware of the benefits of QSBS or the ability to ensure that they avail themselves to these benefits 
and exempt their capital gains. Conversely, in firms with multiple founders, at least one of the 
founders often assumes the role of a business manager that also focuses on investor relations and 
should be able to structure the start-up in such a way that it may qualify for QSBS status. Further, 
some founders also act as advisors to other firms. These advisors can help with operational and 
financial issues such as organization structure and raising capital. As a result, founders who have 
                                                 
9 For example, Wood (2007b, 347) states “No  one  will  accuse  the  QSBS  rules  of  being  particularly  user-friendly.” 
The blog Wealthfront notes, “Unfortunately federal and state tax authorities sometimes make it difficult to claim your 
QSBS benefit.” From https://blog.wealthfront.com/qualified-small-business-stock-2016/ as at January 28, 2018. 
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also acted as advisors to other firms are more likely to have the financial sophistication to be aware 
and able to ensure their firms benefit from QSBS status. Consequently, we predict that start-up 
firms with either two or more founders, or at least one founder who has also acted as an advisor to 
another firm, are more likely to have this financial expertise and, as a result, ensure they qualify 
for QSBS status and thus benefit from the capital gains tax reduction in Section 1202 introduced 
in the 2010 SBJA.  Accordingly, we make our second formal hypothesis: 
H2: The benefits of the 2010 Small Business Jobs Act relating to QSBS will be concentrated 
in qualifying firms with greater financial sophistication. 
 
Providing additional tension to our hypothesized relations, we also note that prior studies 
provide little evidence on whether capital gains taxation affects the supply side of venture capital 
funding. While the theoretical relation between capital gains taxation and financing costs appears 
obvious, it remains an empirical question whether such a mechanism exists for start-up firms. 
Poterba (1989) argues that a personal capital gains tax reduction affects the amount of start-up 
funding mainly through the demand side by encouraging potential founders, rather than from an 
increased supply of funds available from investors. This argument is based on the observation that 
most venture investment comes from entities that are at least not directly affected by personal 
taxation. However, more recently, the market for start-up firm financing has diversified. Several 
crowdfunding platforms allow individuals to invest in start-ups firms.10 Further, current law allows 
mutual funds and partnerships to pass on the tax benefit to their individual shareholders.  
3 Research Design 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
We identify the effect of the reduction in the capital gains tax rate for sales of start-up firm 
                                                 
10 Bernstein et al. (2017) describe in detail how individual investors operate on one of the largest of these platforms, 
AngelList. 
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shares on the volume of funding raised in individual funding rounds using a difference-in-
difference design. More precisely, we estimate how the amount of external equity raised changed 
after the 2010 SBJA became effective for treated firms relative to the change in external equity 
raised for non-treated firms. Non-treated firms are those that are not eligible for the Section 1202 
capital gains tax exemption because of their economic activity (i.e., the industry that they operate 
in). The model takes the following form: ln�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝐗𝐗 + 𝝓𝝓𝒊𝒊 + 𝝓𝝓𝒋𝒋 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which in turn is the US dollar 
amount of equity raised by start-up firm 𝑗𝑗 in funding round 𝑖𝑖. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable that 
captures if the funding round occurred after the implementation date of the 2010 SBJA, September 
27, 2010 (coded as one), or before (coded as zero). 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable that is 
coded as one when start-up firm 𝑗𝑗 is active in a “qualified trade or business” according to Section 
1202, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is the estimate for 𝛽𝛽2, which captures the 
differential effect of the 2010 SBJA introduction on the funding of treated vs. non-treated start-up 
firms. If the capital gains tax exemption effectively reduced the cost of capital and increased the 
amount of funding for start-up firms, we expect 𝛽𝛽2 to be positive. 
Using the amount of funding raised as a measure for capital access of start-up firms has 
several advantages. First, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is readily available from Crunchbase without further 
manipulations or approximations that would be necessary to derive the price per share received in 
the funding round.11 Second, given that the unobserved valuation of the start-up firm should 
already be captured in the fixed effects (discussed below), 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 closely reflects investors’ 
                                                 
11 In fact, given the data available from Crunchbase, a test variable based on price or some valuation multiple is not 
feasible. 
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perception of the investment value of this particular firm over time. Finally, our dependent variable 
corresponds to the logarithm of market value of equity, which is often used as a measure for firm 
valuation (e.g., Blankespoor et al. 2017) and has been found to be superior to share prices for these 
purposes (Fernando et al. 2004). 
All of the start-up firms that we observe individual funding rounds for are private 
businesses. This is an important prerequisite for them to qualify for the Section 1202 exemption 
because, once they become public, shares purchased on the secondary market do not qualify as 
QSBS.12 However, as a consequence, detailed annual balance sheet information is not available 
for these firms and we cannot estimate an investment model using the standard controls that are 
available in conventional models using public firm data (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales 1997; Kausar 
et al. 2016). Instead we rely on an extensive set of fixed effect variables that capture variations in 
external capital raised across individual start-up firms and funding rounds, as well as a set of 
control variables that captures variations in the valuation of individual start-up firms over time.  
We include a set of funding-round specific fixed effects, 𝝓𝝓𝒊𝒊: fixed effects for the ordering 
of the funding round (e.g., the first round, second round, or third round of funding for start-up firm 
𝑗𝑗) and a time fixed effect for the announcement year of the funding round.13 The latter captures 
general time trends in start-up firm financing and macroeconomic effects that affect all start-up 
firms in the same way. 
In addition, we include firm fixed effects denoted by 𝝓𝝓𝒋𝒋  that control for firm-specific 
                                                 
12 An exemption in this regard is the initial public offering (IPO), which is studied by Guenther and Willenborg (1999). 
13 Note, we are able to include year fixed effects in the model because our coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽2, which captures 
the differential effect of the 2010 SBJA introduction on the funding of treated vs. non-treated start-up firms, not the 
main effect on POST. We further note that because we know the exact date of the funding round, we are able to exploit 
within-year variation in funding. As a result, the year fixed effects are not perfectly collinear with the Post indicator 
and the coefficient on POST captures the short-term change in funding following the SBJA for non-treated firms. In 
robustness tests we omit the year fixed effects and observe results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to 
those including the fixed effects. 
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characteristics that do not change over time. In the case of start-up firms, this is also likely to 
capture the underlying valuation of the firm since the entrepreneurial activity of these firms usually 
centres around one particular product or idea that is pursued throughout the initial development 
phase that we observe. Including funding round fixed effects and firm fixed effects in our model 
implies that we identify 𝛽𝛽2 from variation within start-up firms, that is, from firms that raised 
capital both before and after the 2010 SBJA became effective. This greatly reduces concerns that 
some correlated omitted variable is driving the results that we observe from our empirical tests. 
Our model includes a vector of control variables, 𝐗𝐗. At the start-up firm level, we follow 
Hellmann and Puri (2002) by including the age (𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅) of the entity on the announcement day of 
the funding round (in years). This is computed using the founding date contained in Crunchbase. 
Furthermore, we control for investor valuation using the Crunchbase rank (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) of the start-up 
firm on the announcement day of the funding round. The Crunchbase rank uses various proprietary 
algorithms to rank firms according to their importance. According to Crunchbase, this takes into 
account “the number of connections of a profile within the platform, the amount of community 
engagement, funding events, news articles, acquisitions, and more.” The ranking algorithm allows 
for each of these factors to decay over time at different rates such that an individual firm’s rank 
may go up or down when moving from one funding round to the next. In our empirical estimation, 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is computed by dividing the rank provided by Crunchbase by one hundred. 
Following Hsu (2004) we include a dummy variable 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  that indicates whether a 
funding round was conducted by an angel investor (rather than a venture capital firm) as an 
additional control at the funding round level. Angel investors, who are often founders themselves, 
usually provide smaller amounts of early-stage financing before start-ups engage in the first 
professional funding round (Kerr et al. 2014). By including this variable we account for industry 
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preferences of angel investors which may lead to clustering of this type of investors in certain 
groups of start-ups. Furthermore, we include an indicator for funding rounds after the seed stage 
(𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷) which accounts for the fact that seed funding rounds and later-stage rounds differ 
substantially in the associated information environment. We thus control for investor-specific 
preferences with regard to the funding stage at which they invest in start-ups which may be 
correlated with their preference towards certain industries. 
 The firm-level control variables are complemented by a set of variables that capture the 
evolution of the entrepreneurial environment in the state that the start-up firm has its headquarters. 
We obtain data for two control variables from the Kauffmann Index Entrepreneurship Series. The 
first of these control variables is the share of small firms in that state that have grown to at least 
50 employees by their tenth year of operation in all firms with an age of ten years or less 
(𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅). We also include an additional state level control variable that captures 
the average employment growth of start-up firms five years after their founding date in a state in 
each year (𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴). 
To test our second hypothesis, we explore cross-sectional variation in financial 
sophistication among start-up firms. First, we split firms by the number of founders. We 
distinguish between start-ups founded by a single inventor and start-ups with multiple founders. 
The number of founders serves as a proxy for the administrative capacity of the start-up. This is 
consistent with the idea that in single-entrepreneur start-up firms the founding inventor is likely 
focussed on developing its product and does not have the ability and the resources to structure the 
start-up in such a way that potential investors could benefit from the capital gains exemption for 
QSBS. Furthermore, single-founder start-up firms are also potentially not able to comply with the 
substantial reporting requirements for QSBS. In order be able to issue QSBS, firms have to report 
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to the IRS and all shareholders how they meet the criteria for QSBS. Start-up firms with more than 
one founder often consist of one or more inventors, which are mainly focused on the core product 
of the firm, and a manager with expertise in selling and marketing the invention. The latter would 
also include the raising of external capital. In this function, the manager is more likely than the 
inventor to take into account potential benefits from qualifying for the capital gains tax exemption 
in Section 1202 such that the firm could also benefit from the implementation of the 2010 SBJA. 
Second, we explore heterogeneity in the treatment effect with respect to additional advisory 
roles performed by the founders. Here, an advisory role for the founder of a firm is a proxy for the 
sophistication and the managerial experience of the inventors. We argue that more experienced 
founders with more advisory roles are more likely to make use of the QSBS exemption that 
involves a substantial amount of institutional knowledge. Conversely, firms whose founders lack 
advisory experience may also lack the knowledge or ability to respond to the QSBS provisions.  
We first repeat regression (1) for the sample split by the number of founders. In addition, 
we conduct a triple-difference-in-difference analysis by adding the additional interactions 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  to the 
benchmark specification. Consistent with the sample splits, 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the start-up was founded by more than one person 
(𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅). Since 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 does not vary over time, the baseline effect is 
captured by the firm-fixed effects. The variable of interest is the interaction 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ×
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 , which captures the effect of the expansion of the capital gains 
tax exemption for QSBS on treated firms with multiple founders. 
In a second step, we add the interactions of the number of advisory roles of the founders 
of a start-up firm, which varies across time and firms, with our variables of interest (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ×
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𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) as well as the baseline effect 
(𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Again, the variable of interest is the interaction 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ×
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
3.2 Data and Sample 
Information on funding rounds and start-up firms is obtained from Crunchbase. 
Crunchbase is a data provider on start-up firms with the goal of informing potential investors. It is 
updated both directly by start-up firms and by investors, as well as by Crunchbase staff who collect, 
among other items, information on individual funding rounds (amount raised, type of funding, 
number of investors, date) and the start-up firms involved (date founded, number of founders, 
activity). The two main reasons for start-up firms to set up Crunchbase accounts and provide 
information about their enterprise through these accounts are visibility to the media and potential 
customers, and to attract attention from investors. The latter is reinforced because Crunchbase is 
linked to several other databases through which investors frequently choose and analyze potential 
investments (e.g., AngelList, SeedTable). In this way, Crunchbase provides a data that yields a 
unique opportunity to study start-up firms in their early stages (Kaplan and Lerner 2016). 
We begin by obtaining the full sample of start-up firms provided by Crunchbase.com in 
2017, the most recent year available at the time of data collection. The details of the sample 
selection process are provided in Table 2. Due to the nature of our study, we restrict our sample to 
start-up firms located in the United States. We use funding rounds announced from 2005 through 
2016 since, as for the period before 2005 there are generally very few funding rounds recorded in 
the Crunchbase database. We only include firms that were founded on or after January 1, 2000 to 
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focus our analysis on new and potentially innovative start-up firms.14 Since our identification 
originates from within-firm variation, we exclude all firms with less than 2 funding rounds.15  
We only analyze funding rounds that constitute an original issue and thus fulfill a basic 
requirement for being treated as QSBS. Generally, secondary market funding is very rare in the 
database (less than 200 rounds during our sample period), which probably reflects that this is not 
a common way to fund start-up firms at the early development stage. In particular, start-up 
founders are unlikely to sell their own shares before the firm is well established because of the 
negative signal such a sale would send to future investors. Furthermore, we exclude all funding 
rounds that raised an amount above $50 million. This helps ensure that the shares issued in the 
funding rounds we analyze generally qualify as QSBS. Most start-up firms use external capital to 
cover current expenses such as salaries, office and equipment leases, and legal counsel and other 
professional fees. Thus, even those firms that obtain relatively large amounts of external funding 
in early rounds are unlikely to accumulate more than $50 million in total assets, such that their 
shares continue to qualify with regard to the Section 1202 capital gains exemption. However, 
raising an amount above $50 million would most likely not comply with this threshold. 
Crunchbase also provides labels with regard to the type of operating activity of start-up 
firms. We use this information to assess whether a firm falls into one of the categories excluded 
under the “qualified trade or business” requirement of Section 1202 such that they are not affected 
by the introduction of the 2010 SBJA. More precisely, we sort all firms with an excluded activity 
                                                 
14 In our main analysis, the sample includes firms that may only have funding rounds in the pre- (or post-) 2010 SBJA 
implementation period. The use of firm fixed effects in our research design helps ensure that the variation from these 
firms is not driving our results. Nevertheless, as an untabulated robustness check, we repeat our primary analysis on 
a sample that only includes firms with funding rounds both before and after the 2010 SBJA was implemented. The 
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the benchmark result presented and discussed below.  
15 However, by construction (i.e. firm-fixed effects), our results are not altered when including these firms. 
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label listed in Table 3 into the control group and the remaining firms into the treatment group.16 
Finally, we complement the Crunchbase data using information from the U.S. Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulatory filings. In particular, we match Form D filings to the 
entities in our database. Form D refers to Regulation D that states under what circumstances the 
sale of securities does not have to be registered with the SEC (according to the U.S. Securities Act 
of 1933).17 Most of the firms in our sample qualify for these exemption and file Form D instead 
of registering their securities with the SEC. While this form contains much less information on the 
securities, it states the legal form of the issuing firm at the time of the issuance. We use this 
information to ascertain that the firms included in our analysis are corporations and thus qualify 
for a capital gains tax exemption on their shares with regard to the legal form requirement.18 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Our benchmark sample contains 13,431 start-up firms that raised an overall total amount 
of $218.5 billion in 29,280 funding rounds during the sample period. The solid bars in Figure 3 
display the number of firms founded in each year. We note that the number of founded firms grows 
each year in the early part of the sample period and then begins to decline in 2012. This decline is 
primarily caused by two factors. First, our requirement for sample firms is to obtain at least two 
rounds of funding. As founding dates get closer to the end point of the data collection, there is 
likely insufficient time for some firms to have obtained additional funding rounds. The striped bars 
                                                 
16 We also sort firms into the treatment group if their description mentioned any manufacturing process, regardless of 
their actual activity. 
17 To be exempt from registration, firms must comply with one of the following requirements: they offer and sell up 
to $1,000,000 of their securities in any 12-month period (Rule 504); they offer and sell up to $5 million of their 
securities in any 12-month period to accredited investors or a limited number of other persons (Rule 505); they do not 
use general solicitation or advertising to market the securities and offer and sell their securities to accredited investors 
or a limited number of other persons (rule 506). 
18 Note, we are only able to match a subsample of our observations to Form D filings. 
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in Figure 3 display these firms with a single round of funding. Second, this trend also reflects a 
general decrease in early-stage funding in recent years, which has been documented by several 
sources.19 Figure 4 displays the overall and average amount of funding received by start-up firms 
in the sample. We note that, while the total number of newly founded start-ups declines in later 
years, the total amount of funding does not. Rather, it steadily increases to $29.5 billion in 2015. 
At the same time, the average amount of funding raised in one funding round also increases in 
later periods following a temporary decline after the financial crisis in 2008-2009. 
Of our sample firms, the majority of start-up firms (57.1%) were founded before the 2010 
SBJA act was implemented. This is important for our difference-in-difference identification 
strategy that includes firm-fixed effects and thus relies on firm observations with funding rounds 
before and after the 100% tax exemption for capital gains was applied. Each firm goes through a 
number of funding rounds. The median number of funding rounds in our sample is 4 and the 
maximum number for an individual firm is 24.  
The majority of sample firms (9,871) were still operating at the time the data was collected. 
2,524 firms had already been acquired while 351 had gone public. For some firms, Crunchbase 
also provides information on the number of employees that were employed at the time the data 
was collected. These figures are a good indication on how far the start-up firms have grown during 
the observation period. Most firms remain relatively small with 8,939 start-ups having less than 
50 employees. However, a few firms grow much larger: 116 entities in our sample have more than 
                                                 
19 For instance, on November 30, 2017, Victor Basta presented data on TechCrunch, the major news platform for start-
ups, which showed a decline early-stage funding. He concluded that “[…] there has been a quiet, barely noticed im-
plosion in early-stage VC activity worldwide.” (https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/30/theres-an-implosion-of-early-
stage-vc-funding-and-no-ones-talking-about-it/, retrieved January 27, 2018). Similar evidence has been provided by 
Fred Wilson who noted that “The seed and early stage investing market has cooled substantially in the past few years. 
[…] On a deals basis, the cooling off has been dramatic […].” (http://avc.com/2017/12/the-early-stage-slump/, re-
trieved January 27, 2018). 
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5,000 employees at the end of the observation period. 
Table 4 provides the distribution of headquarter locations and industries for the start-up 
firms in our sample. Panel A lists the number of firms and number of funding rounds, our unit of 
observation, for start-up firms headquartered in each U.S. state. 20 More than one third of start-up 
firms in our sample are located in California (see also Figure 2). Other start-up hubs are New York, 
Texas, and Washington. With regard to industries, we sort firms into industries as noted on their 
Form D filings and present the distribution in Panel B. Most firms in our sample are technology-
driven entities of some form. Since many start-up firms create new and innovative products, it is 
not surprising that a large number of our sample firms classify themselves as “Other.”21 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical estimation are presented in 
Table 5. Panel A displays descriptive statistics for the full sample. Start-up firms in our sample 
raise an average of $7.5 million per funding round, or $4 million at the median. This value is 
slightly lower for treated firms, which raise an average of $7 million, while the average funding 
round of control start-up firms raises $8.2 million. While the minimum amount of funding in a 
round in our sample is as low as $1,000, funding rounds usually involve hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, and only 5% of the funding rounds in our sample raise an amount below $125,000. The 
average age of start-up firms in our sample is approximately 4 years. 95% of the firms in the pooled 
sample are younger than 9.2 years. On average, 3.5 investors are involved in one funding round of 
a start-up firm. The maximum number of investors involved is 43 but the large majority of funding 
rounds (i.e., 95% of funding rounds) consist of less than 9 investors. Most firms in our sample 
                                                 
20 In addition to the federal level changes in the taxation of capital gains on start-up firms that we exploit in our tests, 
states can either follow the federal change (conform) or opt to leave the taxation of capital gains unchanged. In 
untabulated tests we examine this state level variation and observe that our findings are not concentrated in either 
the conforming or non-conforming states. This is possibly due to both/either the geographic dispersion of investors 
beyond the home state of the start-up firm and/or the relative small magnitude of state taxes, compared to federal 
taxes. 
21 We note that results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we exclude these “other” firms from our analyses. 
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have been founded by a small number of individual entrepreneurs, with both the mean and median 
number of founders at approximately 2. Few firms are established by more than four founders, and 
the maximum number of founding entrepreneurs in one start-up firm is 15. 
Given our difference-in-difference research design, it is important that the control group 
and the treatment group are similar. We present descriptive statistics for these two subgroups in 
Table 5 Panels B and C. As can be observed from these panels, the differences in the variables 
between the control group and the treatment group are generally small in magnitude. The two 
subsamples are similar in most of the observable characteristics, including across age groups, 
valuation, funding round stages, ranking, location attributes, and number of founders.  
4.2 Estimation Results 
The results of our benchmark difference-in-difference analysis are presented in Table 6. In 
column (1) we present the results from a regression model using the full sample as described above. 
The estimated coefficient for the interaction of the post-reform indicator with the treatment 
indicator is positive and significant at the 5% level. This is evidence consistent with hypothesis 1 
and suggests that the reduction in the capital gains tax rate on the sale of qualified start-up firm 
shares, which was introduced by the 2010 SBJA, had a positive impact on the amount of capital 
raised by start-up firms. More precisely, it suggests that the 2010 SBJA increased the funding 
amount per funding round of qualifying start-up firms by approximately 11.98%. Evaluated at the 
average amount of funding available to treated firms in our sample, this implies that the 2010 
SBJA generated an additional funding amount of $9.6 billion for start-ups. 
There appears to be no general change in start-up funding immediately after the 
implementation of the SBJA as the lack of significance of the coefficient for the post-reform 
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indicator variable indicates.22 With regard to the other control variables, we find that older start-
up firms obtain more financing. Within start-up firms, funding grows by about 11.6% per year. 
This possibly reflects that entrepreneurial firms become more professional in organizing their 
investor relations as they grow older. Furthermore, information asymmetries between potential 
investors and the start-up firm founders are reduced over time as more information about the firm 
is revealed through its operations. We also find that firms that are ranked higher in the Crunchbase 
ranking system obtain more funding. This is consistent with the Crunchbase ranking capturing the 
external valuation of the start-up firm. The effect is, however, small in magnitude. Our results 
suggest, that moving up by one hundred ranks increases the amount of funding in a particular 
funding round by 0.1%. Recall, the mean unscaled rank in our sample is 39,246.23 
In column (2), we reduce our sample to only those firms that we identified through their 
SEC filings to be incorporated. Again, results are consistent with hypothesis 1 as the coefficient 
for the interaction of the post-reform and the treatment indicator is positive and significant, now 
at the 1% level. Compared to the result in column (1), the effect is slightly larger. The results in 
column (2) imply that the 2010 SBJA increased the funding raised by qualifying firms by 14.2%. 
The increase in magnitude is likely to be attributed to the possible inclusion of non-qualifying 
firms in regression (1). This increases noise in our estimation and may also induce a downward 
bias. Again both the age and the Crunchbase rank of a firm at the announcement of a funding round 
increase the amount of capital raised in a funding round. 
The findings presented in columns (1) and (2) are robust to including additional controls 
                                                 
22 Note that we capture general time trends by announcement year fixed effects such that the post-reform indicator 
variable only captures variation within 2010. We also run our model without year fixed effects and obtain qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar results. In such a specification, however, we estimate a significantly negative coefficient for 
the post-reform indicator variable as it also captures a negative time trend in the average size of individual funding 
rounds. 
23 As we are unsure exactly how Crunchbase determine their rankings, we repeat our analyses removing 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 from 
the regression model. Inferences remain unchanged. 
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in column (3). We estimate negative coefficients for both state-level measures of start-up activity, 
although neither of the coefficient estimates is significant at traditional levels. 
As a robustness check, we repeat regression (3) without year-fixed effects in column (4). 
The coefficient of interest (𝛽𝛽2), which captures the effect of  the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 interaction 
term, remains statistically significant with a similar magnitude. In this specification we estimate a 
significantly negative coefficient for the post-reform indicator variable, as it also captures a 
negative time trend in the average size of individual funding rounds.  
To gain further insights regarding the start-up firms that benefit, to a greater extent, from 
the 2010 SBJA, we turn to hypothesis 2. We first split the sample and run regressions separately 
on funding rounds for all start-up firms with only one founder and on funding rounds for start-up 
firms with two or more founders. Results from these subsamples are presented in Table 7. 
Consistent with hypothesis 2, for the firms with only 1 founder, we find no effect of the 2010 SBJA 
on capital raised. In contrast, and providing further evidence consistent with hypothesis 2, we find 
a significantly positive coefficient when we restrict our estimation sample to funding rounds of 
start-up firms with two or more founders. The estimated coefficient is almost twice as large as the 
coefficient estimate in the benchmark regressions (1) and (2) of Table 6. Both results are robust to 
adding state-level controls for general trends in entrepreneurship reported in columns (3) and (4). 
These results are also confirmed in the triple difference-in-difference analysis, which are presented 
in column (5). Here, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 ×
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  is significantly positive, which implies that treated firms with multiple 
founders obtained more funding after the 2010 SBJA implementation. The estimated coefficient 
for the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 interaction is not significantly different from zero, which implies that 
the effect in the benchmark regression is driven by start-up firms with multiple founders while 
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start-ups with single inventors did not respond. 
In Column (6) of Table 7 we present results when including the interaction of the variables of 
interest with the number of advisory roles performed by the founder of a start-up firm. The 
estimated coefficient for the benchmark interaction of interest,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷,  remains 
significantly positive and large. Consistent with the notion that start-ups with more financially 
sophisticated founders are more likely to benefit from the expansion of the QSBS exemption under 
the 2010 SBJA, the positive significant coefficient on 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 × 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
indicates that the increase in funding was stronger for start-ups whose founders have more advisory 
roles at the time of the funding round. Taken together, these findings imply that funding of start-
up firms with greater financial sophistication likely drives the effect we observe.  
4.3 Robustness Tests 
We perform a number of analyses as a check of the robustness of the main findings. Our 
robustness tests include the use of a generalized difference-in-difference research design, analyses 
around the size of funding rounds, the effect of the 2003 tax cuts, and a placebo test. 
4.3.1 Generalized Difference-in-difference Design 
As a  robustness check, we present results using a generalized difference-in-difference 
design in line with Jacobson et al. (1993). In this setting, we re-estimate the model including the 
interactions of the treatment indicator with the full set of announcement year fixed effects instead 
of the post-reform indicator. The estimated coefficients for the interactions capture the difference 
in capital raised between the treatment and control group in each year of our sample period that 
remains after controlling for other factors and can thus be attributed to the 2010 SBJA. By 
obtaining estimates for each individual year around the reform, we are able to assess the dynamics 
of the 2010 SBJA. This has two advantages. First, it allows us to verify that, after controlling for 
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various determinants, there is no significant difference in capital raised between the treatment and 
the control group prior to the reform validating our difference-in-difference identification strategy. 
Second, we can use the generalized difference-in-difference design to assess whether the 2009 
reform, which preceded the 2010 SBJA and increased the exemption rate in Section 1202 from 50% 
to 75% had any significant impact. A disadvantage of the generalized difference-in-difference 
design is that we cannot use the exact date of the reform implementation to separate pre- and post-
reform periods. Furthermore, this setup does not allow us to make inferences regarding the overall 
impact of the reform, but only displays the effect in individual years.24  
We present the results of the generalized difference-in-difference estimation graphically in 
Figure 5. The coefficients for the pre-reform interactions are all small and not significant. In 
separate tests for their joint significance, as well as the significance of the sum of the pre-reform 
interaction coefficients, we cannot reject the null (𝑝𝑝 -values of 0.80 and 0.95, respectively). 
Furthermore, we observe positive differences between the treatment and the control group only 
after the implementation of the 2010 SBJA. The coefficient for the interaction of the treatment 
indicator and the indicator for funding round announcement in 2009 is close to zero and 
insignificant. We infer that the 2010 reduction in taxes is the decisive event in our analysis.   
4.3.2 Large Funding Rounds 
We next perform tests to check whether our results are robust to excluding funding rounds 
with large amounts of capital raised by reducing our sample to funding rounds that have raised less 
than $10 million. This test provides additional comfort that our treated firms are below the $50 
million asset threshold required to qualify as QSBS.  
In untabulated tests we observe that the estimated coefficient on the POST × TREATED 
                                                 
24 Both issues do not arise in our benchmark model that we use to estimate the impact of capital gains tax reduction. 
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interaction term is similar in magnitude, which suggests that our main results is primarily driven 
by smaller funding rounds. While, for reasons outlined above, we do not expect start-up firms 
involved in funding rounds with more capital raised to disqualify for the capital gains tax 
exemption, it is reassuring that the main effect of the 2010 SBJA is strong in small start-up firms 
where we have a higher degree of certainty that they are not too large to qualify as QSBS. It is also 
of note that these smaller observations make up the majority of firms in our sample. 
4.3.3 Treatment Effect after the Expiration of the 2003 Tax Cuts 
The capital gains tax cut introduced in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2003 (JGTRRA) expired on January 1, 2013, as a result the top standard rate on capital gains 
increased from 15% to 20% on that day. The capital gains tax exemption for investments in QSBS 
was therefore relatively even more valuable from 2013 onwards. It is possible that the treatment 
effect of the 2010 SBJA could be more pronounced or concentrated in the years following 2013 
for two reasons. First, the control group was exposed to a higher capital gains tax rate. Second, the 
increase in the value of the QSBS capital gains tax exemption could have induced more firms to 
comply with the corresponding rules and offer QSBS. On the other hand, the expiration of the 
2003 JGTRRA tax cuts increased capital gains taxation only for those investors in the top personal 
income tax bracket, which might have limited its impact. 
We test how the post-2013 period affects the results in an additional analysis that restricts 
the sample period to 2005-2012. In untabulated tests we observe results consistent with the notion 
that the treatment effect of the 2010 SBJA was more pronounced when the capital gains tax rate 
was higher in the years from 2013 onwards. The coefficient remains significantly positive and only 
slightly decreases in magnitude (coefficient ranges between 0.092 and 0.115 depending on the 
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controls included in the various specifications). This implies that the 2010 SBJA affected funding 
for start-up firms both before and after the expiration of the 2003 JGTRRA tax cuts. 
4.3.4 Fin-Tech and the Financial Crisis 
Another potential concern related to our tests is that the 2010 SBJA, which we use for 
identification, occurred near the financial crisis. Because we use a difference-in-difference rdesign, 
concerns regarding the financial crisis polluting our analyses are reduced as the financial crisis 
would only cause a problem for our tests if it differentially impacted control and treatment firms. 
While we do not view this as likely, one possible scenario that could impact our tests is if fin-tech 
start-up firms are driving our results. Fin-tech firms are in our control group and it is plausible that 
the financial crisis disproportionately drove funding down for these firms. To assuage this concern, 
in untabulated analysis we examine the trend in funding for Fin-tech firms and do not observe a 
decrease in funding for Fin-tech firms following the financial crisis. As a result, it is unlikely that 
a drop in funding for Fin-tech firms following the financial crisis is driving our results. 
4.3.5 Placebo Test 
An additional potential concern is that the estimated impact of the implementation of the 
2010 SBJA is either merely a random effect or captures some spurious correlation(s) with omitted 
variables. If this were the case, we should obtain the same results independent of the assignment 
of treatment and control observations. We test this possibility through a placebo test where we 
randomly assign firms to treatment and control groups, keeping the ratio of treated to non-treated 
firms identical to the original sample (see Table 5). Using these randomly assigned treatment and 
control groups, we rerun our benchmark regression with the full set of controls and the sample 
restricted to incorporated entities (i.e., the specification is identical to regression 3 in Table 6). We 
repeat this exercise for 1,000 estimations and report the resulting 𝛽𝛽2 coefficients on the POST × 
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TREATED interaction term in a histogram in Figure 6. We find a significantly positive impact (5% 
confidence level) only for 26 of the 1,000 trials (2.6%). Further, only 0.6% of the estimated 𝛽𝛽2 
coefficients on the POST × TREATED interaction term are equal or larger than the coefficient 
estimated in our benchmark regression using the original sample (0.134, represented by a solid 
vertical line in the figure). These results reassure us that our tests capture the treatment effect of 
the 2010 SBJA on start-up funding and not some random effect or omitted variable. 
5 Additional Analysis 
We next perform several additional analyses to shed additional light on the effects of the 
SBJA and the QSBS capital gains tax exemptions.  
5.1 Timing of Gain Realization 
One requirement for start-up shares to be eligible to the QSBS capital gains tax exemption 
is that they must be held for at least 5 years. Given that IPOs and acquisitions of start-ups are often 
the point when investors make an exit and realize the gains of their investment, this condition may 
provide an incentive for start-ups and their investors to prolong the time between the first funding 
round and these events. If it exists, this incentive would have become more important after the 
implementation of the 2010 SBJA, which increased the value of the QSBS capital gains tax 
exemption. This would, however, also imply that the 2010 SBJA distorts the development of small 
firms by potentially delaying their access to public capital markets. 
There are reasons to believe that the QSBS requirements do not affect the timing of start-
up acquisitions and IPOs. First, investors are still eligible for the QSBS exemption if they hold on 
to their shares in these events, which is entirely possible in an IPO and to lesser extent in an 
acquisition. In this way, the presence of shareholders with potential QSBS benefits is less likely to 
stop a start-up from accessing capital markets. Second, there are other factors that are likely to be 
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more important for IPO timing such as market conditions (Altı 2005), reputation concerns and 
proficiency of investors (Gompers 1996; Lerner 1994; Tian et al. 2016), or product market 
competition (Chemmanur and He 2011). These parameters could dominate the IPO timing decision 
and make considerations regarding the QSBS exemption less relevant. 
We use acquisitions and IPOs reported in Crunchbase to investigate whether the 2010 
SBJA affected the timing of gain realizations by investors. We only use firms that were founded 
before the 2010 SBJA implementation to be able to compare firms with similar potential life-spans. 
Firms that were founded in later periods could be affected by the 2010 SBJA but are also observed 
for a shorter period of time in our sample. Of the selected start-ups in the estimation sample, 369 
firms founded before September 27, 2010 pursue IPOs and 2,019 are acquired during the sample 
period. In Table 8, we report the average number of years between the first funding round and the 
event that could trigger the realization of capital gains (IPO or acquisition) for treated and control 
firms. We differentiate between firms that have announced all their funding rounds before the 2010 
SBJA implementation and those that also had funding rounds after September 27, 2010. The latter 
are likely to be affected by the 2010 SBJA while the former are not.  
On average, the time between the first funding round and the acquisition or the IPO is 
longer than five years. Focussing first on the timing of IPOs, we observe no marked difference 
between the average number of years from the first funding round to the IPO between firms with 
and without funding rounds after the 2010 SBJA implementation. This is true for both treatment 
and control firms. On average, treated firms wait about half a year longer until going public. With 
regard to the average number of years until an acquisition, the waiting period is higher for firms 
with funding rounds after September 27, 2010. However, this increase is observed for both control 
and treatment firms. We thus cannot attribute this effect to the increase in the QSBS capital gains 
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tax exemption but might rather relate it to general market conditions that affected all start-up firms 
similarly. Thus, we do not detect any significant effect of the QSBS exemption on the timing of 
start-up IPOs or acquisitions. This observation is confirmed by a more thorough regression 
analysis that is reported in Table 9 and also takes into account general time trends and location 
effects. Therefore, we conclude that for the start-up firms in our sample, the 2010 SBJA did not 
distort the timing of going public or being acquired. We note, however, that two data features limit 
this analysis. First, we can only analyze the timing of those start-ups for which we observe either 
an IPO or an acquisition. If the impact of the QSBS exemption on the timing of these events only 
evolves over time, we are not able to see it for those firms that were founded in the later part of 
our sample period. Second, it is not possible to observe the behavior of the initial investors in the 
observable IPOs and acquisitions and one thus cannot definitively determine whether this is driven 
by an effort to preserve the QSBS benefit. 
5.2 Number of Investors and Funding per Investor 
Our main results are consistent with an increase in the amount of funding that qualified 
firms raise in each funding round following the 2010 SBJA. The increase in total funding per round 
potentially comes from (i) additional investors providing funding to qualified start-ups, (ii) existing 
investors providing a greater amount of funding in each funding round, or (iii) some combination 
of (i) and (ii). To examine which of these possibilities are likely driving the increase in funding we 
observe, we examine the average number of investors, and amount of funding per investor, for 
both the treatment and control groups annually during our sample period.  
Figure 7, Panel A presents the average number of investors per funding round annually for 
the treatment and control group. The figure illustrates that the number of investors per funding 
round increases during the sample period for both groups of start-up firms. In the early part of the 
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sample period, the average number of investors per funding round is greater for the control group. 
In the latter part of the sample period, the average number of investors per funding round is greater 
for the treatment group, with the switch occurring in 2010. This descriptive evidence is consistent 
with an increase in the number of investors at least partially accounting for the increase in funding 
for qualifying start-up firms following the SBJA of 2010.25 
Figure 7, Panel B presents the average amount of funding per investor per funding round 
annually for the treatment and control group. The figure illustrates that the amount of funding per 
investor per funding round remains relatively constant throughout the sample period. The average 
amount of funding per investor per funding round is higher for the control group than for the 
treatment group throughout the sample period and the spread between the two groups is also 
relatively stable, with no substantial change pre-/post 2010. This descriptive evidence is not 
consistent with a change in the amount of funding each investor is providing per round for 
qualifying start-up firms following the SBJA of 2010. Taken together, the overall evidence is 
consistent with scenario (i) detailed above, that the increase in funding for qualifying start-up firms 
following the 2010 SBJA is driven by additional investors providing funding to those qualifying 
firms (i.e., increasing the supply of funding to start-up firms). 
5.3 Alternative Dependent Variable 
Finally, in Table 10 we use a different dependent variable and provide a multivariate test 
of the impact of the SBJA on the number of investors per funding round. Specifically, we  replace 
the dependent variable in main specification by the logarithm of the number of investors, ln(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅). In column (1) of Table 10 we present the result of a regression using all 
                                                 
25 We also examine a number of investor characteristics to determine if any are associated with a propensity of in-
crease investment in qualified start-up firms following the 2010 SBJAs. In untabulated analyses we fail to document 
a significant association between investment in treated firms in the post period and if the investor (i) has previously 
acted as an advisor, (ii) has a law degree, (iii) has a business degree, or (iv) has an economics degree. 
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observations in the full sample for which the number of investors is recorded in Crunchbase. The 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive at the 1% level. This implies 
that the implementation of the 2010 SBJA increased the number of investors per funding round. 
This finding is robust to using a nonlinear count model in column (2) where we employ the Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) in a panel 
fixed effects estimation. We obtain qualitatively similar results when restricting the sample to 
firms whose incorporation we can verify through their SEC filings and when adding additional 
state-level variables in columns (3) and (4), respectively. 
6 Conclusion 
In this study we analyze the effect of capital gains taxes on investments in start-up firms 
through an examination of the amount of capital raised by these early stage entrepreneurial firms. 
Using detailed data on capital raised by start-up firms in individual funding rounds, we estimate 
the effect of the 2010 SBJA, which implemented a full exemption from federal taxation of capital 
gains from the sale of qualified shares (QSBS). The difference-in-difference design exploits the 
fact that some start-up firms were not affected by this reform, as their shares generally do not 
qualify as QSBS because of the underlying economic activity of the firm. We find that capital 
gains taxes have a significantly negative impact on the amount of funding obtained by start-up 
firms. The capital gains tax reduction introduced by the 2010 SBJA, which decreased the effective 
federal capital gains tax rate on the sale of QSBS by 8.75 percentage points, raised the amount of 
investment in start-up firms per funding round by about 12%. This effect is, however, confined to 
entrepreneurial firms with more than one founder and firms with founders that have also acted as 
advisors to other firms, which suggests that only start-up firms with a more financial sophistication 
are able to benefit from the capital gains tax exemption.  
34  
 
There are two important takeaways from this study. First, a targeted reduction in capital 
gains taxes appears to be a useful policy to ease access to external financing for start-up firms. 
Given that these firms are an important driver of innovation and economic growth, such reforms 
may have a positive impact on the whole economy. Second, a large administrative burden limits 
the extent to which entrepreneurial firms can benefit from such a policy. In particular, single-
founder start-up firms, and firms without founders that are also advisors, do not appear to be 
sophisticated enough to exploit the capital gains tax exemption and make their shares more 
attractive to external investors.   
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Appendix: Variable Definition 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 The number of advisory roles performed by the founders of a start-up firm at the time of the funding round as reported by Crunchbase. 
  
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 Difference between the announcement date of the funding round and the funding date of the issuing firm in years from Crunchbase. 
  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  An indicator variable set equal to one if the funding round involved an angel investor (as reported by Crunchbase), zero otherwise. 
  
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  An indicator variable set equal to one if the funding round was not an early-stage seed investment (as reported by Crunchbase), zero otherwise. 
  
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅  Variable capturing the experience of a founder. It is either equal to 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅  or to 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. 
  
FOUNDERS Number of founders of the start-up as reported by Crunchbase. 
  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 Number of investors involved in a funding round as reported by Crunchbase. 
  
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  An indicator variable set equal to one if the start-up was created by two or more found-ers (as reported by Crunchbase), zero otherwise. 
  
POST An indicator variable set equal to one if the funding round was announced after effec-tive date of the 2010 SBJA (September 27, 2010), zero otherwise. 
  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 Amount of capital raised in a funding round from Crunchbase.  
  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 Crunchbase rank divided by 100 
  
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 Employment growth of start-ups from the Kauffman Foundation. Average percentage change in employment of start-ups five years after founding in the state where the is-
suing start-up is active. 
  
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 Scalability of start-ups from the Kauffman Foundation. Number of firms that started small but grew to employ fifty people or more by their tenth year of operation as a percentage of all employer firms ten years and younger in the state where the issuing 
start-up is active. 
  
TREATED 
An indicator variable set equal to one if the start-up is conducting activities that are 
deemed to be a “qualifying trade or business” in the sense of Section 1202 and are thus 
affected by the capital gains tax reduction of the 2010 SBJA. 
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Figure 1: Google Trends, Searches for “Qualified Small Business Stock” in the United 
States, 2008-2016
 
This figure reports the evolution of the number searches for “Qualified Small Business Stock” in the United States 
from 2008 to 2016. The highest value is indexed to 100. 
 
Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of Start-Ups (Number of Start-ups 2005-2016) 
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Figure 3: Number of Start-ups Founded, 2000-2016 
 
 
Figure 4: Funding Raised (2005-2016) 
 
This figure displays the total amount of funding (in billion $, bars, left axis) and the average amount of funding per 
round (in million $, line, right axis) for funding rounds of the start-up firms in the estimation sample from 2005 to 
2016. 
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Figure 5: Generalized Difference-in-Difference Design 
 
   
 
This figure presents the results of a generalized difference-in-difference design following Jacobson et al. (1993). The 
checks mark the coefficient estimates 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 from the regression of the following model 
 ln�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2009𝑡𝑡=2005 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2016𝑡𝑡=2011 + 𝜷𝜷𝐗𝐗 + 𝝓𝝓𝒊𝒊 + 𝝓𝝓𝒋𝒋 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  indicates that founding round 𝑖𝑖 by start-up 𝑗𝑗 was announced in year 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑿𝑿, 𝝓𝝓𝒊𝒊  and 𝝓𝝓𝒋𝒋 are the same vectors 
of control variables and fixed effects as in model (1). 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 marks start-ups conducting activities that are deemed 
to be a “qualifying trade or business” in the sense of Section 1202 and are thus affected by the capital gains tax 
reduction of the 2010 SBJA. 95% coefficient intervals are plotted around the coefficient estimates. The dotted red line 
marks the event of the reform. In line with previous literature we omit the interaction of the implementation year 
dummy and normalize it to zero in order to avoid perfect collinearity. The estimated coefficients 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 thus have to be 
interpreted as the difference between the treatment and control group, after controlling for other factors, relative to 
year 2010.  
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Figure 6: Random Assignment to Treatment and Control Group 
 
 
This figure presents a histogram of the estimated coefficients of a falsification test. In each of the 1,000 separate 
estimations, the treatment and control group are randomly assigned following a uniform distribution with the ratio of 
treated and control firms identical to the one of the original sample (see Table 5). Then, the benchmark model with 
the full set of controls and a restriction to incorporated firms (i.e. a model equivalent to column 3 in Table 6) is re-
estimated using the randomly assigned treatment variable. The reported coefficients are for the interaction 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 ×
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷. 
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Figure 7: Number of Investors and Funding over Time 
 
Panel A: Average Number of Investors per Round 
 
 
Panel B: Amount Invested per Round 
 
 
This figure displays the total average number of investors (Panel A) and average amount of funding per investor per 
round (Panel B) for funding rounds of the start-up firms in the estimation sample from 2005 to 2016.  
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Table 1: Activities not deemed to be "qualified trade or business" under Section 1202(e)(3) 
Services Financial activities Other 
• Health 
• Law 
• Engineering 
• Architecture 
• Accounting 
• Actuarial science 
• Performing arts 
• Consulting 
• Athletics 
• Financial services 
• Brokerage 
• Banking 
• Insurance 
• Financing 
• Leasing 
• Investing 
• Farming 
• Harvesting trees 
• Extracting activities (de-
fined in Section 613 and 
613A) 
• Hotels 
• Motels 
• Restaurants 
The table lists the activities that are stated in Section 1202(e)(3) as not qualifying for the capital gains tax exemption. 
In addition to the listed activities, any trade or business where the reputation or skill of one or more employees of a 
firm is the principal asset of that firm is excluded from the tax exemption. Furthermore, any firm for which more than 
10% of the value of its net assets consists of shares in other firms or 10% of the overall value of its assets consists of 
real property is excluded from the exemption. 
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Table 2: Sample Selection 
 
No. Sample Selection Number of Observations 
(1) Pre-IPO and acquisition funding round observations recorded in Crunchbase 
2005-2016, US entities 
 
71,549 
(2) Excluding firms with implausible founded dates 70,184 
(3) Excluding non-equity financing 58,828 
(4) Excluding firms founded before 2000 53,098 
(5) Excluding funding rounds which raised more than $50 million USD 51,682 
(6) Excluding funding rounds without sufficient information on control variables 35,849 
(7) Excluding firms with only one funding round 29,280 
(8) Excluding firms which have not filed a firm D 19,212 
(9) Excluding firms which are not a corporation according to their Form D filing 17,846 
This table describes the sample selection process. Implausible founded dates are firms that were founded after the first 
founding round recorded on Crunchbase. 
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Table 3: Activity Labels of Control Firms 
 
Accounting Credit Cards Hospitality Psychology 
Advice Crowdfunding Hotel Real Estate Investment 
Agriculture Crowdsourcing Impact Investing Resorts 
Alternative Medicine Cryptocurrency Independent Music Restaurants 
Angel Investment Debit Cards Industrial Engineering Retirement 
Animal Feed Debt Collections Insurance Seafood 
Aquaculture Dental Law Enforcement Shipping Broker 
Architecture Emergency Medicine Leasing Stock Exchanges 
Asset Management Environmental Consulting Legal Theatre 
Assisted Living Environmental Engineering Life Insurance Therapeutics 
Auto Insurance Farmers Market Livestock Trading Platform 
Banking Farming Management Consulting Transaction Processing 
Billing Finance Mechanical Engineering Travel Accommodations 
Bitcoin Financial Exchanges Medical Venture Capital 
Business Intelligence Financial Services Medical Device Veterinary 
Career Planning Forestry Mineral Wealth Management 
Chemical Engineering Fruit Mining Wood Processing 
Civil Engineering Genetics Music  
Clinical Trials Government Nursing and Residential Care  
Commercial Insurance Health Care Payments  
Compliance Health Diagnostics Performing Arts  
Concerts Health Insurance Personal Finance  
Consulting Hedge Funds Personal Health  
Cosmetic Surgery Home Health Care Precious Metals  
Credit Hospital Property Insurance  
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Table 4: Start-ups and Funding Rounds 
 
Panel A: By State 
State No. of 
Start-
ups 
No. of 
Funding 
Rounds 
 State No. of 
Start-
ups 
No. of 
Funding 
Rounds 
Alabama 11 30  Missouri 41 218 
Alaska 2 7  Montana 8 26 
Arizona 45 166  Nebraska 15 58 
Arkansas 12 38  Nevada 22 73 
California 3,453 12,549  New Hampshire 26 94 
Colorado 179 735  New Jersey 79 281 
Connecticut 68 260  New Mexico 8 61 
Delaware 9 34  New York 922 3,251 
District of Columbia 39 155  North Carolina 101 411 
Florida 127 464  North Dakota 1 2 
Georgia 96 430  Ohio 111 407 
Hawaii 5 23  Oklahoma 8 22 
Idaho 10 38  Oregon 82 331 
Illinois 190 621  Pennsylvania 154 664 
Indiana 58 159  Rhode Island 22 91 
Iowa 9 37  South Carolina 13 61 
Kansas 18 61  South Dakota 1 2 
Kentucky 22 62  Tennessee 67 327 
Louisiana 12 32  Texas 307 1,226 
Maine 10 40  Utah 84 311 
Maryland 97 368  Vermont 7 25 
Massachusetts 684 2,759  Virginia 115 425 
Michigan 60 232  Washington 310 1,113 
Minnesota 75 302  West Virginia 2 7 
Mississippi 2 10  Wisconsin 49 179 
    Wyoming 1 2 
       
Total 7,849 29,280     
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Table 4 (continued)  
 
Panel B: By Industry 
Industry No. of Start-ups No. of Funding Rounds 
Agriculture 4 19 
Airlines and Airports 1 2 
Biotechnology 322 1,737 
Business Services 45 145 
Commercial 1 1 
Commercial Banking 3 8 
Computers 172 675 
Construction 2 9 
Electric Utilities 1 3 
Energy Conservation 18 94 
Environmental Services 4 22 
Health Insurance 1 2 
Hospitals and Physicians 4 15 
Insurance 1 3 
Investing 2 4 
Investment Banking 0 2 
Manufacturing 23 97 
Oil and Gas 1 7 
Other 579 2,219 
Other Banking and Financial Ser-
vices 
28 89 
Other Energy 61 274 
Other Health Care 351 1,759 
Other Real Estate 5 20 
Other Technology 2,088 9,097 
Other Travel 8 20 
Pharmaceuticals 128 650 
Pooled Investment Fund 2 5 
Residential 2 6 
Restaurants 5 17 
Retailing 71 294 
Telecommunications 81 352 
Tourism and Travel Services 8 26 
Total 4022 17,673 
48  
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 
5%  
percen-
tile 
Median 95% percentile Max 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 29,280  7,463,949  9,167,521  1,000  125,000  4,000,000  28,366,767  49,999,989  
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 29,280  3.688 2.754 0.000 0.416 3.047 9.181 16.888 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 29,280  448.705 304.001 1.120 48.515 392.460 955.145 1,000  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  29,280 0.030 0.171 0 0 0 0 1 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  29,280 0.791 0.407 0 0 1 1 1 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 29,125  0.014 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.028 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 29,125  0.571 0.132 0.039 0.411 0.554 0.821 1.984 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 23,341  3.488 2.870 1  1  3  9  43  
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 25,070  2.040 1.057 1  1 2  4  15  
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  25,070 0.644 0.479 0 0 1 1 1 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅  29,269 0.279 1.122 0 0 0 2 24 
 
Panel B: Treated Firms 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 
5%  
percen-
tile 
Median 95%  percentile Max 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 18,977  7,066,980 8,584,359  1,000 145,000 3,975,000 25,000,000 49,999,989 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 18,977  3.487 2,643 0 0.373 2.855 8.852 15.926 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 18,977  426.780 294.406 1.120 45.760 362.260 942.630 1,000 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  18,977 0.035 0.185 0 0 0 0 1 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  18,977 0.780 0.414 0 0 1 1 1 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 18,875  0.014 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.028 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 18,875  0.574 0.131 0.039 0.412 0.554 0.821 1.984 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 15,761  3.517 2.906 1 1 3 9 43 
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 16,649  2.108 1.073 1 1 2 4 11 
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  16,649 0.672 0.469 0 0 1 1 1 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅  18,969 0.295 1.131 0 0 0 2 24 
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Panel C: Control Firms 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 
5%  
percen-
tile 
Median 95% percentile Max 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 10,303 8,195,123 10,114,107 1,000 120,000 4,000,000 31,000,000 49,700,000 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 10,303 4.060 2.913 0 0.501 3.403 9.732 16.888 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 10,303 489.089 316.994 3.180 52.120 446.580 965.600 999.980 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  10,303 0.021 0.142 0 0 0 0 1 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  10,303 0.810 0.392 0 0 1 1 1 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 10,250 0.014 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.019 0.028 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 10,250 0.565 0.135 0.127 0.392 0.554 0.818 1.984 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 7,580 3.429 2.794 1 1 3 9 39 
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 8,421 1.905 1.012 1 1 2 4 15 
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 8,421 0.587 0.492 0 0 1 1 1 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅  10,300 0.250 1.105 0 0 0 2 24 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full 
sample, Panel B for the treatment observations, and Panel C for the control observations. Detailed variable definitions 
are presented in the appendix. 
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Table 6: Regression Results: Capital Raised, Pooled Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 -0.088 -0.070 -0.071 -0.156*** 
 (0.058) (0.065) (0.066) (0.045)    
     
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 0.113*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.130*** 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 0.110*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.023*   
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.012)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -0.924*** -1.042*** -1.039*** -1.102*** 
 (0.059) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  1.018*** 1.095*** 1.095*** 1.178*** 
 (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅   -20.035 -25.552*** 
   (12.423) (8.288)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴   -0.122 0.255*** 
   (0.108) (0.095)    
     
Firm and Funding Round Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y N 
No. of Observations 29,280 17,846 17,733 17,733  
No. of Start-ups 13,431 7,399 7,351 7,351  
𝑅𝑅2 0.441 0.423 0.423 0.410    
This table presents the results of a difference-in-difference analysis. We estimate the following model ln�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝐗𝐗 + 𝝓𝝓𝒊𝒊 + 𝝓𝝓𝒋𝒋 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The dependent variable in all columns is the logarithm of $ raised in a particular funding round. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 indicates that the funding 
round was announced after the effective date of the 2010 SBJA (September 27, 2010) and 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 marks start-ups conducting 
activities that are deemed to be a “qualifying trade or business” in the sense of Section 1202 and are thus affected by the capital 
gains tax reduction of the 2010 SBJA. Column (1) presents regressions using the full sample. In Column (2), a regression using the 
reduced sample including only start-ups that have been verified to be incorporated through their SEC filings is displayed. The 
regression in Column (3) adds additional control variables. All regressions include firm fixed effects, announcement year fixed 
effects and funding round fixed effects. Column (4) presents results from a replication of regression (3) without announcement year 
fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered on the start-up level) are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Detailed variable definitions are presented in the appendix. 
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Table 7: Regression Results: Capital Raised, Heterogeneity in Experience of Founders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Multiple Founders 
Multiple 
Founders 
Multiple 
Founders 
Multiple 
Founders 
Multiple 
Founders 
Advisory 
Roles 
       
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 0.094 -0.115 0.089 -0.104 -0.081    -0.063    
 (0.110) (0.095) (0.110) (0.095) (0.083)    (0.066)    
       
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷   -0.012 0.198*** -0.011 0.195*** -0.016    0.124**  
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)    (0.050)    
       
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅      0.095    -0.007    
     (0.083)    (0.043)    
       
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅      0.213**  0.057*   
     (0.104)    (0.033)    
       
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅       -0.007    
      (0.032)    
       
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 0.085 0.118*** 0.085 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 
 (0.052) (0.043) (0.053) (0.043) (0.033)    (0.031)    
       
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)    
       
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  -0.858*** -1.156*** -0.861*** -1.154*** -1.071*** -1.037*** 
 (0.154) (0.112) (0.154) (0.112) (0.090)    (0.089)    
       
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  0.931*** 1.156*** 0.935*** 1.155*** 1.102*** 1.093*** 
 (0.070) (0.049) (0.071) (0.049) (0.041)    (0.039)    
       
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅   -24.057 -8.976 -18.191    -19.140    
   (19.912) (17.381) (13.189)    (12.438)    
       
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴   0.037 -0.237 -0.098    -0.120    
   (0.180) (0.147) (0.115)    (0.108)    
Firm, Funding Round and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of Observations 5,876 9,044 5,847 8,971 14,818  17,725  
𝑅𝑅2  0.370 0.511 0.371 0.511 0.458    0.424    
This table presents the results of a difference-in-difference analysis. We estimate the following model ln�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝐗𝐗 + 𝝓𝝓𝒊𝒊 + 𝝓𝝓𝒋𝒋 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 indicates that the funding round was announced after the effective date of the 2010 SBJA (September 27, 2010) and 
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 marks start-ups conducting activities that are deemed to be a “qualifying trade or business” in the sense of Section 1202 
and are thus affected by the capital gains tax reduction of the 2010 SBJA. In columns (1) to (5), 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 is captured by the 
variable 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, which is an indicator that is equal to 1 if more than one founder was involved in the creation of the 
start-up. Column (1) and (2) present regression results using start-ups with one founder or two and more founders, respectively. 
The regressions in columns (3) and (4) add additional control variables. Column (5) presents regression results for the full sample 
with interactions. Since 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 is time-invariant in this specification, baseline effect is captured by the firm-fixed effects. 
In column (6), 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 is defined as 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅, which is the number of advisory roles that the founders of a start-
up firm have at the time of the funding round. Only start-ups which have been verified to be incorporated through their SEC filings 
are used in the estimation. All regressions include firm fixed effects, announcement year fixed effects and funding round fixed 
effects. Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered on the start-up level) are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Detailed variable definitions are presented in the appendix.  
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Table 8: Average Number of Years until Gain Realization 
  Average Number of Years 
between First Funding 
Round and  IPO 
Average Number of Years 
between First Funding Round 
Acquisition 
    
    
Treatment 
group 
 
All funding rounds before 2010 
SBJA implementation 
6.330 5.269 
   
At least one funding round following 
2010 SBJA implementation 
6.252 5.725 
   
Change 0.078 -0.457 *** 
    
    
Control 
group 
All funding rounds before 2010 
SBJA implementation 
5.714 5.352 
   
At least one funding round following 
2010 SBJA implementation 
5.773 5.785 
   
Change -0.060 -0.433* 
    
    
Difference in changes between the Treatment vs. 
Control groups 
0.138 -0.024 
    
This table displays the average number of years between the first funding round of start-ups and the IPO or acquisition, 
respectively. It includes all start-ups for which an acquisition or IPO is observed. ***, **, and * indicate changes 
and/or differences are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 9: Regression Results: Timing of Gain Realization 
 (1) Years until IPO 
(2) 
Years until Acquisition 
   
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 1.533* 1.582*** 
 (0.880) (0.251)    
   
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 1.343 0.008    
 (1.167) (0.226)    
   
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 -1.312 0.021    
 (1.203) (0.271)    
   
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 -0.002** -0.001**  
 (0.001) (0.000)    
   ln (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷) 0.778*** 0.533*** 
 (0.145) (0.046)    
   
No. of Observations 369 2,019    
Year and State Fixed Effects Y Y 
𝑅𝑅2 0.606 0.420    
This table presents the results of a difference-in-difference analysis of the following form: 
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = β1𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + β3𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝐗𝐗 + 𝝓𝝓𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the time between the first funding round and the IPO (in column 1) or acquisition (in column 2) of 
start-up 𝑗𝑗 in years. 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  is a dummy variable that indicates whether any funding round of start-up 𝑗𝑗 
occurred after September 27, 2010. 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  marks start-ups conducting activities that are deemed to be a 
“qualifying trade or business” in the sense of Section 1202 and are thus affected by the capital gains tax reduction of 
the 2010 SBJA. 𝐗𝐗 is a vector of controls that includes the average Crunchbase rank of start-up 𝑗𝑗 over all funding 
rounds, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, and the logarithm of the overall amount raised in all funding rounds by start-up 𝑗𝑗, ln (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷). 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
is a vector of location (US state) and founding year specific fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 10:Regression Results: Number of Investors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 -0.048** -0.030 -0.019 -0.019    
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026)    
     
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 0.066*** 0.039** 0.059*** 0.060*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 0.002 0.008 -0.004 -0.005    
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴  0.164*** 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  -0.122*** -0.148*** -0.123*** -0.122*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅    -3.713    
    (4.835)    
     
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴    -0.021    
    (0.042)    
     
Firm and Funding Round 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y    
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y   
No. of Observations 23,341 18,491 13,617 13,524  
No. of Start-ups 11,567 6,717 6,202 6,160  
𝑅𝑅2  0.774  0.775 0.775    
This table presents the results of a difference-in-difference analysis. We estimate the following model ln�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝐗𝐗 + 𝝓𝝓𝒊𝒊 + 𝝓𝝓𝒋𝒋 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The dependent variable in columns (1), (3) and (4) is the logarithm of number of investors in a particular funding 
round. Column (2) estimates a count model using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator proposed by 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006), again using the number of investors in a particular funding round as dependent variable. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 indicates that the funding round was announced after the effective date of the 2010 SBJA (September 27, 2010) 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 marks start-ups conducting activities that are deemed to be a “qualifying trade or business” in the 
sense of Section 1202 and are thus affected by the capital gains tax reduction of the 2010 SBJA. Column (1) and (2) 
present regressions using the full sample. In Column (3), a regression using the reduced sample including only start-
ups that have been verified to be incorporated through their SEC filings is displayed. The regression in Column (4) 
adds additional control variables. All regressions include start-up fixed effects, announcement year fixed effects, and 
funding round fixed effects.  Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered on the start-up level) are presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in the appendix. 
